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bottlenecks. While, depending on the nature of the shock, expansions may require reinforcement
or stabilization, recessions should always be softened. In the long run, institutions, such as those
governing capital-labor relations, may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation.
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from production to reduce appropriation – as manifested in the role capital-labor substitution played
in the rise of European unemployment.
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Abstract
Specific quasi-rents build up in a wide variety of economic relationships, and are ex-
posed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract. The recognition that such con-
tracts are often incomplete has yielded major insights into the organization of macroe-
conomic exchange. Rent appropriation, we argue, also has important macroeconomic
implications. Resources are underutilized, factor markets are segmented, production
stiers from technological “sclerosis, “ job destruction is out of balance with creation,
recessions are excessively sharp, and expansions run into bottlenecks. While, depending
on the nature of the shock, expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization, reces-
sions should always be softened. In the long run, institutions, such as those governing
capital-labor relations, may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation.
Technology choice will also be affected, with the appropriated factor partially “exclud-
ing” the other from production to reduce appropriation — as manifested in the role
capital-labor substitution played in the rise of European unemployment.
1 Introduction
An asset is specific to a relationship to the extent that its value is greater within the
relationship than outside. Economic specificity is a pervasive phenomenon. It arises when
a firm selects and invests in a worker; when the worker spends his learning years in a firm;
when capital is invested in a unionized firm or industry; when a bank extends credit to an
entrepreneur; when an upstream firm makes investments to serve downstream customers;
when foreign direct investment flows into a country.
l Respectively: MIT and NBER; Capital Guidance. We are grateful to Giuseppe Bertola, Olivier Blan-
chard, Peter Diamond, and seminar participants at ECARE, LSE, IMF, MIT, NYU, OFCE, Wharton,
Yale, and the NBER 1996SummerInstitute (EFCCL) for helpful comments. Caballero thanks the NSF for
financial support.
1Specificity in a relationship reduces the flexibility of separation decisions, which induces
reluctance in the investment decision. This is the basic insight of the irreversible invest-
ment literature. But specificity acquires a potentially more troublesome dimension when
combined with contracting difficulties. To the extent that it is irreversible, entering into a
relationship creates specific quasi-rents that may not be divided ex post according to the
parties’ ez ante terms of trade. Avoiding this transformation from an ex ante competitive
situation to an ex post bilateral monopoly — known in the literature m the “fundamental
transformation” or the “holdup problem” — requires prior protection through comprehen-
sive and enforceable long-term contracts. The problem is that such contracts are much
closer to a methodological benchmark than a description of actual practices. 1
Relationship specificity, together with the recognition of the difficulties involved in ac-
tual contrxting, is a central building block in the modern economic theory of institutions
(Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1979 and 1985). Specificity as a central
dimension of transaction description forms the basis of insightful theories of the firm and
internal organization (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990), of finan-
cial structure (e.g., Williamson 1988; Hart and Moore 1994; Shleifer and Vishny 1995),
of public-choice institutions and credibility (e.g., North and Weingast 1989; Thomas and
Worrall 1994), and a variety of other institutional arrangements. The common feature in
those theories is the idea that a main function of institutional arrangements is to allow the
transacting parties to partly circumvent the holdup problem,
The institutional literature generally acknowledges that, while institutions often help
alleviate appropriability, they rarely resolve the problem fully. From a macroeconomic per-
spective, the prevalence of unprotected specific rents makes it a potentially central factor in
determining the functioning of the aggregate economy. Transactions in the labor, capital,
lThe problem of the ~PProPriability of relationship-specific investment goes back earlY in the history
of economic thought. Marx, in Das Capital, saw in it a channel for the capitalist exploitation of labor:
“The knowledge, the judgement, and the will, which, though in ever so small degree, are practiced by the
independent peasant or handicraftsman [...] — these faculties are now required only for the workshop as a
whole. Intelligence in production expands in one direction, because it vanishes in many others. What is lost
by the detail laborers, is concentrated in the capital that employs them [...]” (as cited by Rosenberg 1965).
Simons (1944) took the opposite view, that it is labor that takes advantage of specificity to appropriate
capital: “Frankly, I can see no reason why strongly organized workers, in an industry where huge investment
is already sunk in highly durable assets, should ever permit a return on investment sufficient to attract
new capital or even to induce full maintenance of existing capital.” He provided an early analysis of the
resulting under-investment: “[t]he bias against new investment inherent in labor organization is important
[...]. Investors now face [...] the prospect that labor organizations will appropriate most or all of the earnings
[...]. Indeed, every new, long-term commitment of capital is now a matter of giving hostages to organized
seflers of complementary services .“
2or goods markets are frequently characterized by some degree of specificity. The creation of
a job, for example, typically involves relationship-specific investments by the firm and the
worker (e.g., Becker 1964). Beyond its purely technological wpect, effective specificity may
be increased by such institutional features as dismissal regulations (which devalue the firm’s
option of using its investment outside the relationship) or unionization (which narrows the
firm’s outside option to a sector outside the scope of the union). In partial equilibrium, un-
resolved opportunism results in reduced investment incentives, because the resulting specific
quasi-rents may later be partly appropriated by others (e.g., Simons 1944; Grout 1984). In
general equilibrium, as the problem of creating and sharing quasi-rents spreads throughout
the economy, the market system will adjust to help compensate the appropriated factors,
providing a highly inefficient macroeconomic “solution” to the unresolved macroeconomic
contracting problems. This general-equilibrium adjustment can affect major aspects of the
aggregate functioning of the economy.
In this paper we attempt to characterize the nature and implications of the macroeco-
nomic “solution” to the holdup problem. 2 Throughout the paper we think of the problem as
one where two factors of production contemplate either committing to a partly irreversible
joint-production relationship, or remaining in “autarky.” Section 2 sets up this model and
draws some basic macroeconomic implications. The problem of appropriability implies, in
general equilibrium, that factors of production are underemployed; that the market for the
“appropriating” factor is segmented (i.e., it experiences involuntary unemployment in joint
production); that the productive structure is “sclerotic” (i.e., too many low-productivity
units are kept in operation compared to an efficient economy); and that, paradoxically, the
economy exhibits excessive destruction of production units given its depressed level of cre-
ation. The section concludes with a discussion of the canonical set of policies that restore
macroeconomic efficiency.
Section 3 turns to cyclical implications, and focuses more closely on the labor/capital
interpretation of the two factors — where we take those factors’ distinguishing features to
be that the supply of uncommitted capital to form joint-production units to be more elastic
2A number of recent contributions have examined various implications of appropriable quasi-rents in
general equilibrium setting. Makowski and Ostroy (1995) highlight the key role that “appropriation” plays
in the efficiency of markets. Ramey and Watson (1996) analyze the interactions of the holdup problem and
effort incentivization in a matching model. More applied examples are MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), who
study the macroeconomic effects of employment contract forms that attempt to avert investment holdup;
Acemoglu (1996), who examines the effects of search-related incomplete contracting on human capital accu-
mulation; and Robinson (1995), who looks at the economics and politics of labor-market institutions when
employment contracts are incomplete.
3than that of labor. In this context, we show that, at low levels of activity, labor is the factor
that experiences market segment ation (i.e., there is involuntary labor unemployment), while
at high levels of activity it is the market for capital that is segmented (i.e., there are labor
shortages). Moreover, the cyclical response of the economy is excessively elastic (compared
to an efficient economy) when the labor market is segmented, and excessively rigid when
the capital market is segmented. Put differently, recessions bring unnecessarily severe
unemployment, while expansions run into bottlenecks sooner than efficient. This implies, in
particular, that the economy will have an asymmetric response to a symmetric shock process
. with sharp recessionary dips and recoveries followed by shallow expansions. Moreover,
this asymmetry implies that an increwe in the volatility of macroeconomic shocks will
decrease average employment and output. We conclude that while — depending on the
nature of the shock — expansions may require stabilizat ion or reinforcement, recessions
should always be softened.
Section 4 touches on issues relating to the longer-term response of institutions and
technology to the presence of unprotected specificity. From a political point of view, each
factor will seek, as an ez ante united group, institutional developments that increase the
other factors’ specificity. But this political incentive for rent appropriation has its limits,
because it inherently results in ez post internal segmentation of the appropriating factor
between employed winners and unemployed losers. It is through that channel that the
macroeconomic inefficiency of opportunism enters into the factor’s political calculation,
and, beyond a point, starts dominating any additional distributional gain.
Over the long run, the economy will also respond along its technological dimension in an
attempt to circumvent the appropriability problem. A principal dimension of technological
adaptation is in the relative factor proportions used. We show how, in equilibrium, technol-
ogy choice is essentially determined by the appropriated factor, That factor, we argue, has
an incentive to reduce appropriation by selecting a technology that partly “excludes” the
other factor from joint production. The result is a distorted capital-labor ratio and further
under-employment of the appropriating factor. This exclusion phenomenon is consistent
with the role that capital-labor substitution seems to have played in the rise of European
unemployment.
Section 5 concludes with a series of macroeconomic questions that can be illuminated
by drawing on the ideas developed in this paper. An appendix follows.2 Appropriable Rents in General Equilibrium
2.1 Factor Specificity in Joint Production
In this section we lay out the model that we use to analyze the general-equilibrium implica-
tions of specific qu~i-rents in the joint use of factors of production. Our basic model takes
as given the institutional framework and available technology. It is therefore appropriate
for the study of short to medium term equilibrium, but must be used more selectively in
the study of long-term issues. Section 4 discusses the implications of endogenizing long-run
institutional and technological evolution,
Productive structure
Our model economy has one consumption good and two factors of production, denoted as
factor 1 and 2. The two factors are identified with optimizing agents, who derive linear
utility from the consumption good, which we use as the numeraire.
Production takes place in two modes, identified with separate sectors of the economy.
Factors 1 and 2 can either produce separately in their respective Autarky sectors, or combine
in the Joint Production sector. For each factor i, we denote by U1 total employment in
Autarky and by Ei total employment in Joint Production.
Each factor’s Autarky sector is perfectly competitive and characterized by an aggre-
gate production function Fi(Ui). In Joint Production, factors 1 and 2 combine in fixed
proportions to form “production units.” A production unit combines Z1 units of factor 1
with Z2 units of factor 2 to produce ~ units of the consumption good, We denote by E
the total number of production units. Parameters Z1, Z2 >0 and ~ are given by available
technologies. The implications of allowing for short-run substitutability between factors,
and for even greater substitutability in the long run through technological development will
be discussed in section 4.
Creation and destruction
We study a one-period economy. There is a mass E“ of preexisting production units that
were formed before the start of the period. There is also a mass U; and U; of uncommitted
factors of type 1 and 2, that are not part of a pre-existing unit. For each factor z = 1, 2,
we fix total factor supply to one:
ziEO + U,” = 1. (1)
Production units that are newly created this period have common revenue y“. Pre-existing
production units have heterogeneous revenues ~, whose distribution D(r) is given by the
5history of technology adoption and idiosyncratic shocks. Naturally, D(+m) = EO. If the
minimum revenue required for survival (see below) is denoted by ~“, then the total number
of pre-existing units destroyed is D(~O).
The timing of production is as follows. In a first phwe, pre-existing production units
decide whether to continue operation for this period, or to separate and releme their factor
resources. In a second phase, factors that were released from pre-existing units and uncom-
mitted factors can choose to form new production units, or remain in Autarky. In the final
phme, factors in all sectors produce.
A number of identities will be useful in what follows. Denoting by C the number of
new units created, and recalling that D(yO) is the number of pre-existing units destroyed, —
we have
E= EO+c– D(yO); (2)
Ei = ziE; (3)
Ui = u; – Zic + ziD(yO), (4)
where i = 1, 2. The first identity equates the number E of production units to the number
of pre-existing units plus net creation; the second gives Joint Production employment for
each factor as a function of E; the last identity gives Aut~ikj- employment for each factor
as a function of the number of uncommitted factors and net creation.
Specificity and incomplete contracts
When factors join to form a new production unit, they develop a degree of specificity with
respect to each other, and a share #z l [0, 1] of factors i = 1,2 can no longer be used outside
the production unit. If the factors separate, only (1 – @i)zi units of factor i can be used
elsewhere. Specificity can be a pure aspect of technology, or, as discussed in the examples
of section 2.2, can be due to institutional factors.
Specificity creates quasi-rents whose value is the difference between the value of the
factors within the production unit and their value in their best outside use. To guarantee
that specific quasi-rents will be divided according to the factors’ ex-ante terms of trade, the
factors must enter an ex-ante contract that governs their participation in the production
unit and the division of its surplus. Unfortunately, such ideal contracts are quite difficult
to achieve in practice.
In general, the contract must take into account the full complexity of the concrete situ-
ation. Specific investments are typically made not once, but incrementally throughout the
6life of a production unit. The contingent plan for making such investments, the duration
of the relationship, and the rent-division mechanism must be pre-specified from the start
and made fully contingent on the future profitability of the production unit, on factors
that determine its evolving prospects, and on the various events, both aggregate and id-
iosyncratic, that govern each factor’s outside opportunity costs. The contract must also
specify the many dimensions that characterize each factor’s participation in production,
again possibly based on contingencies outside the factors’ control. A variety of problems of
observability, verifiability, enforceability, and sheer complexity, make such ideal contracts
rarely possible. In practice, agents enter into arrangements — what one might loosely call
“incomplete contracts” — that leave plenty of room for ex-post discretion.3 (For a clear
discussion of incomplete contracts in the presence of specificity, see chapter 4 of Hart 1995).
When pre-contracting is not possible, the division of specific quasi-rents must be de-
termined ex post. It is well known that, in this case, the relation between the two factors
undergoes, in Williamson’s (1985) term, a “fundamental transformation” from an ex-ante
competitive setting to an ex-post bilateral monopoly. To analyze the effect of incomplete
contracting, we distinguish between two extreme cases: the “efficient” equilibrium, where
factors are able to engage in full contractual precommitment, and the “incomplete con-
tracts” equilibrium, where no precommitment is possible.
Free entry and exit
We can now turn to the determination of factor rewards in different sectors, and the free-




pa = F;(ui) (5)
any equilibrium with O < U2 < 1. Assuming the functional form
F2(Ui) = ,+;,qi [1-(1 -ui)’+’’~’] , ~~>0
for the Autarky production function, we get a constant supply-elasticity q~ for factor z into
3A simple transaction that would overstep the need for contracting altogether is an exchange of factors
that allows a single agent to own both factors in a production unit. In the first two examples we develop
in section 2.2 below, this solution is made impossible by the fact that one side of the transaction involves
“inalienable” human capital. In the third example, it is limited by span-of-control and other limits to the
extent of vertical integration.Joint Production:
Ei=p~, 2=1,2, (6)
taking (1) and (2)-(4) into account. Naturally, Fi (Ui) is increasing and concave in Ui.4
Turning to Joint Production, we let w? denote the unit-compensation of factor i in a
newly created production unit. To differentiate between variables when equilibrium condi-
tions are different for the efficient and incomplete-contracts equilibrium, we use an asterisk
to denote the former. In the efficient equilibrium, factors in new production units are
compensated according to their ex-ante opportunity cost p!, i.e.
W;* = P: 1 i=l,z. (7)
In the incomplete-contracts equilibrium, factor compensation in new production units is
governed by their ex-post opportunity cost (1 – ~i)pi. The specific quasi-rent Sn from
such a production unit is the difference between the unit’s revenue Yn and the ex-post
opportunity costs of its factors:
Sn = Yn – (1 – 41)Pl~l – (1 – @2)p2z2. (8)
Following the Nash bargaining solution for sharing the unit’s revenue, we assume that each
factor i gets its ex-post opportunity cost plus half of the unit’s bargaining surplus Sn:516
w~xi = (1 — ~i)piZi + +Sn. (9)
In the efficient case, the entry condition for the creation of new units is
y“ 2 pyxl + p;x2. (lo)
4The strict concavity of the Aut arky production function implies the presence of a tbird “quasi” factor.
This becomes relevant in the distributional analysis of section 4.1, where it is briefly discussed (see footnote
20).
5We implicitly assume that each type of factor in the production unit forms a coalition that bargains as
a single agent.
6An alternative specification of the “disagreement point “ in bargaining yields the Shaked and Sutton
(1984) sharing rule that allocates ~y” to each factor as long as neither factor z = 1,2 receives less than
(1 – ~~)pizi. (See Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986 for a discussion of the foundational differences
between the two approaches). The discrete change in the way the opportunity cost (1 – ~i)p,zi enters the
Shaked-Sutton rule makes it less attractive for an “aggregate” model. Otherwise, our main conclusions do
not depend on the specific sharing rule.In the incomplete-contracts case, the rule for factor i to participate in Joint Production is
W? >pi, 2=1,2. (11)
It is easy to show from (8)-(9) that (11) is equivalent to
gn > pixz + p-ix-i + (~ipi~i – @mip-i~=i) , ~ = 1,27 (12)
where =i denotes the factor other than z. The difference between the efficient entry condition
(10) and this condition for factor z is the term
Ai = @ipaxi –
Considering that the expression ~jpjzj memures the value of what factor j sinks into the
relationship, Ai memures the net eflective specificity of factor i. Ai is positive if z sinks in
a greater value than the other factor, and negative otherwise. Since A-i = –Ai, we denote
their absolute value by A ~ IAa 1. Condition (12) for i requires that revenues ym cover the
two factors’ outside opportunity costs, plus the net effective specificity Ai factor z would
sink into the relationship. It is obvious that it is the entry condition of the factor with
positive net specificity that is binding, so that, taken together for z = 1,2, the two entry
conditions (12) are equivalent to
y“ z plzl +p2z2 + A. (14)
We now turn to the separation decision of factors in pre-existing units. To avoid clouding
the analysis with side-effects, we do not assume that pre-existing units exhibit any factor
specificity. Otherwise, because factors would lose a fraction ~i if the unit separates, total
factor supply would effectively depend endogenously on destruction, and would therefore






the opportunity cost of factors in a preexisting unit is Aiw~ + (1 – Ai)pi. For a pre-existing
unit to survive, its revenues must at least cover the sum of its two factors’ opportunitycosts.7 In other words, the free-exit condition for a pre-existing unit is ~ > ~“, where the
“destruction margin” Y“ is given by
y“ = A1’wyzl + (1 – Al)plzl + A2W;Z2 + (1 – A2)p2z2. (16) —
By equation (7), in the efficient equilibrium, the revenue requirement for survival reduces
to
g“* = p;xl +p;xz. (17)
Eflcient and incomplete-contracts equilibrium
We are now ready to define equilibrium in both the efficient and the incomplete-contracts
case. We make parameter assumptions that guarantee an “interior” equilibrium in both
cases, so that free-entry condition (14) holds with equality and all sectors have positive
employment.
Assumption 1 (Interior Equilibrium) We assume that O < y“ < Zv and E“ <
where ZY is given by
{(
zv=min Z] 1+






The upper-bound ZY on yn guarantees that Joint Production revenues are not high
to drive Autarky employment to zero. The upper-bound ZE on the number E*




An (interior) incomplete-contracts equilibrium is a set of variables (C, E, El, E2, PI, P2,
w~, w;, Y“) that satisfies free-entry condition (14) with equality, as well as equations (2)-
(3), (6), (8)-(9), (13), and (15)-(16). An (intetior) eficient equilibrium is a set of variables
(C*, E“, Et, E;, P;, P;,’w?*,W;*,y ‘*) that satisfies the efficient free-entry condition (10)
‘This separation rde is ptivately efficient. Specific quasi-rents give rise to the possibilityy of privately
inefficient separations whenever there is a “non-transferability” problem, due, for example, to asymmetric
information. See Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) for a general result, and Hall and Lazear (1984) for an
application to the labor market.
‘This condition is stronger than needed at this stage, but it will turn out to be helpful in the rest of the
paper.
10with equality, m well as equations (2)-(3), (6)-(7), and (17) with (C, ~, El, ~z, pI, p2, ~“)
replaced by (C*, ~“, ~(, ~~, p;, p;, y“ *). The following proposition establishes existence —
and uniqueness for both types of equilibrium (proofs for all propositions can be found in
the appendix).
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness) An incomplete-contracts equilibrium ez-
ists, is unique, and satisjies C, Ei, Ui > 0, i = 1,2. An eficient equilibrium exists, is
unique, and satisfies C*, E:, U,* >0, i = 1,2.
Assumption 1 guarantees that equilibrium is characterized by positive creation and positive
employment in Joint Production and Autarky.
Before we turn to the basic implications of our model, it is useful to look at some
examples.
2.2 Examples
Specificity and appropriable quasi-rents characterize a variety of transactions that are preva-
lent throughout the economy. Our highly stylized model can be given a number of inter-
pretations. We discuss three main examples that touch on the labor, financial, and goods
markets.
Example 1: Labor and capital
The two factors can be interpreted as labor and capital (now denoted as z = 1,k). This is the
prime example in this paper, and will be used specifically to develop the analysis in sections
3 and 4. Joint Production consists of worker employment and capital investment within the
firm. Autarky for workers corresponds to “unemployment” — voluntary or involuntary —
or employment in sectors that are relatively immune to contracting problems (and example
typical of the developing world is the “informal” sector, where constant returns and low
capital requirements allow for self-employment). Autarky for capital corresponds either to
investment abroad, or consumption. We think of labor = the relatively inelastic factor (low
ql), while capital is relatively elastic (high q~).
Firm and worker typically sink various forms of specific investments into their relation-
ship (see Becker 1964, for example). #k > 0 arises when the firm finances organizational
or human capital embodied in the worker. Why does not the worker make the investment
instead? Possibly because the investment is firm-specific as well as worker-specific, and pos-
sibly because the worker does not have sufficient wealth (and cannot obtain competitive
11outside financing for the same incomplet~contracts remons that render the firm’s invest-
ment appropriable). #l > 0 arises when the worker dedicates part of his lifetime learning
opportunities to firm-specific knowledge. A special case of firm- and worker-specificity that
has been studied extensively in the labor-market literature are search costs expended by
firms and workers, which, by their very nature, cannot be protected by ex-ante contracting.
Generally, one expects each side to make, over time and in various ways, investments that
are specific to the other, so that both @l and ~k will be positive.
Specificity can have an important institutional origin, in addition to its technological
dimension. Consider, for example, the case of workers who are able to form a union to
negotiate with their employer. The power of the union may derive from firm investments
that are embodied in workers as a group — again, ultimately a contracting problem — or
from legislation. 9 With unions, it is not only worker-specific investments but the full set of
firm- or industry-specific capital that can become relationship-specific and enter the scope
of the union. Legislation on dismissals and severance pay provides another example of
institutionally-driven specificity. The imposition of severance pay, for example, depending
on the form it takes, would effectively increase ok or reduce ~1.
Example 2: Extewal finance
A second interpretation is to think of the above as modelling
firms. The first factor would then represent “managers,” who
the external financing of
possess management and
entrepreneurial skills; the second factor would represent the capital of outside financiers
(shareholders and lenders). The delegation of control rights over the firm’s assets to man-
agement makes those assets partly management-specific (e.g., Williamson 1988; Hart and
Moore 1994). If it withdraws from the relationship, management can, in various ways, cause
serious damage to the firm’s value — by withdrawing their firm-specific human capital,
withholding vital information on the firm and its assets, or undertaking highly disruptive
acts of omission or commission. The different ways in which financiers can protect the
value of their investment from management appropriation is the subject of the “corporate
governance” approach to finance (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1995). Although we do
not emphasize this interpretation, our results can help shed light on the macroeconomic
implications of financial constraints (see Caballero and Hammour 1996c).
‘See, e.g., Lindbeck and Snower (1986). In this context, appropriability finds its clearest expression in
the phenomenon of “strikes.” The only reason strikes put any pressure on employers is that it is costly —
for technological or legal reasons — to substitute outsiders for striking insiders, i.e. capital has some degree
of specificity with respect to labor. That is precisely the leverage used by insiders to improve their deal.
12Example 3: Vertical relationships
A third example draws on the role of specificity in the literature on vertical integration
(e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978). Our two factors would then represent the capital
of upstream suppliers and of downstream customers, respectively. Buyer and seller may
make mutually specific investments (@i > O). An electric utility may invest in a plant
that is specific to a supplier (by locating it near a coal mine, for example) or specific
to a customer (by locating near an industrial complex). A special case of this example
are “customer markets ,“ where the upstream supplier is a final-goods producer and the
downstream customer is a consumer (e.g., Phelps and Winter 1970).
2.3 Under-employment and Rationing
A macroeconomic situation where one factor is open to appropriability by another, if
widespread throughout the economy, results in offsetting macroeconomic adjustments to
guarantee that appropriated factors obtain adequate returns in general equilibrium and
satisfy their free-entry condition. This general-equilibrium response affects major aspects
of the macroeconomy, which appear as symptoms of an inefficient macroeconomic “solu-
tion” to the unresolved appropriability problems. This section describes general-equilibrium
implications for factor employment.
The main benchmark for an incomplete-contracts equilibrium is an efficient economy.
We start by giving parameter conditions for the incomplete-contract equilibrium to be
efficient.
Proposition 2 (Balanced Specificity) The incomplete-contracts equilibrium is eficient
ifl, in equilibrium,
@lPl~l = @2P2~2, (18)
which will happen ifl the economy’s parameters satisfy
(19)
Condition (18) for efficiency is equivalent to requiring zero net effective specificity A,1° In
other words, it requires that, even though factors may sink some degree of specificity y with
loThroughout we ~~~ume the two factors’ bargaining share parameter to be equal. If not, the ‘fficiency
condition must me modified by dividing each side of (18) by the bargaining share of the corresponding
factor.
13respect to each other, their interdependence be “balanced. ”
To interpret this balanced-specificity condition, note that effective specificity ~ipaxi is
determined not only by the specific share @iZi, but also by the factor’s Autarky reward pi =
E1/qi. A factor with unattractive outside opportunities in Autarky (low pi) has relatively z
low effective specificity, because the relative value of what it sinks into the relationship
is low. When the factors are completely symmetric — i.e. @l = 42, ql = q2 and Z1 =
Z2 — condition (19) for balanced appropriation holds. Positive net appropriation comes
from asymmetries in the parameters that determine factor specificity. If everything else is
symmetric, the appropriating factor will be (z) the factor with the lower specific share ~ixi;
and (ii) the factor with the lower elasticity qi.
What is the effect of appropriability if the efficient parameter condition does not hold?
The first effect of appropriability is to reduce the employment level in Joint Production:
Proposition 3 (Under-employment) ln an inefficient incomplete-contracts equilibrium
both factors are under-employed:
Ei<E~, 2=1,2.
Underemployment results from the decreased incentives of the appropriated factor to enter
Joint Production, since it is that factor’s entry rule that holds with equality. Equalization
Pi = W? of the appropriated factor’s Autarky and Joint-Production returns is achieved
partly by depressing its own opportunity cost pi and partly by reducing the appropriating
factor’s opportunity cost Pmi (to support w?), both of which involve a reduction in Joint-
Production employment.
The second implication of appropriability is market segmentation of the appropriating
factor:
Proposition 4 (Market Segmentation) In an inefficient incomplete-contracts equilib-
rium, let i be the ‘(appropriated” factor — i.e, Ai > 0. The market for factor i clears,
while the market for the other factor is segmented:
w; = pa and W~i > p~i. (20)
Net appropriation involves one of the factors capturing rents, which inherently induces
market segment ation for that factor. To see this, note that the market for factor j clears iff
~s” = @jPjxj (see equation 9), i.e. its share of specific qu~i-rents exactly compensates it
14for what it sinks into the relationship. Since ~Smgoes to each of the factors, both markets
clear simultaneously only under balanced specificity, i.e. when equilibrium is efficient.
Otherwise, let i be the appropriated factor (A2 > O). Given that we have an interior
equilibrium, it is obvious from (12) that it is factor z’s free-entry condition that holds with
equality. The other factor market is segmented, and its return differential is obtained by
1 n = @~p~z~in (9) for factor 12: replacing ~s
(~!i – p~i) z-i = A~. (21)
Thus, taking A/z~~ per unit, net effective specificity measures the extent of the appropri-
ating factor’s market segmentation.
Net appropriation gives rise to the “involuntary” unemployment of the appropriating
factor in Joint Production, which persists because that factor cannot precommit to a com-
pensation lower than equilibrium w~i. The number of “slots” open in Joint Production is
determined by the appropriated factor’s free-entry condition, and are rationed among units
of the appropriating factor.
2.4 Productive Sclerosis and Unbalanced Gross Flows
Besides the level and structure of factor employment, appropriability affects the manner in
which production units restructure in response to evolving profitability.
The following proposition states that the inefficient economy exhibits “productive scle-
rosis,” in the sense that pre-existing units are kept in operation with lower levels of prof-
itability than in an efficient economy.
Proposition 5 (Sclerosis) An inefficient incomplete-contracts equilibrium exhibits ‘~ro-
ductive sclerosis”:
~“ <go”.
The scrapping margin in an inefficient equilibrium is lower than in an efficient equilibrium.
To see why, rearrange expression (16) for ~“ taking the accounting identity
w~xz into account:




efficient equilibrium there is no market segmentation (w;* = p;, j = 1, 2),
scrapping margin is y“ * = y“. This is intuitive, since pre-existing units can be —
15costlessly replaced by new units that produce g“. On the other hand, if i is the appropriated
factor in an inefficient equilibrium, the market for factor mi will be segmented (w; = pi
and w~i > p-i) and expression (22) for the scrapping margin becomes lo = y“ – (1 –
~~i) (w~i – p~i) z-i < Yn (since >~i <1 in an interior equilibrium). In this cme, the outside
opportunity cost of the factors in a pre-existing unit is less than yn because released units
of factor =i are not guaranteed a slot in Joint Production and, with probability 1 – A-i,
may end up in Autarky earning less. Sclerosis is thus tightly related to factor-market
segmentation. Coupled with under-employment, it is likely to constitute a powerful drag
on economic growth.
The next proposition characterizes the efficiency of the gross flows of production units.
We define aggregate income as
W(c, y”) = ync +
/ ‘~dD(~) +~ Fi(U,– ZiC+ ZiD(~O)). (23) —
go icl,z
where the argument in function Fi (Ui) is obtained by replacing (4) for Ui. The proposition
states that, in an inefficient economy, creation is generally insufficient and destruction is
excessive. This captures an important dimension of ‘employment crises” during macroeco-
nomic adjustment episodes (see Caballero and Hammour 1996a and 1996 b).
Proposition 6 (Creation and Destruction) An inefficient incomplete-contracts equi-









due to the fact that
D’(y”) >0.
the appropriated factor i has reduced in-
centives to enter Joint Production because of positive net appropriation. When there is a
positive density D’ (y”) > 0 of pre-existing units at the destruction margin, excessive de- —
struction is due to the excessively high compensation of the appropriating factor -i in Joint
Production, given that it is involuntarily unemployed. From a social point of view, the out-
side opportunist y cost of a unit of factor -i in a pre-existing unit is its Aut arky reward p-i;
from a private point of view, it is higher and equal to p-i + A=i (w-i – p~i), which values
16the possibility of capturing specific rents in a new unit. This high private compensation is
what causes destruction to be excessive. An extreme case arises when Autarky corresponds
to unproductive labor unemployment (p~~ = O). The social opportunity cost of labor in
that case is zero, and any positive wage is too high and results in excessive destruction.
It may appear paradoxical that the economy exhibits both sclerosis and excessive de-
struction. In fact, the former is a comparison with the efficient equilibrium; and the latter
is a comparison between the social and private values of a pre-existing unit in the inefficient
equilibrium. The coexistence of “sclerosis” and “excessive destruction” uncovers the fallacy
of a “liquidationist” approach in our cent ext, that would see in a recession a healthy way
of cleansing the productive structure from sclerosis (see, e.g., De Long 1990). There is no
sense in liquidating sclerotic production units if the released factors will not be reabsorbed
in Joint Production through an adequate creation rate.
2.5 Dual Optimal Policy Design
We now turn to the problem of designing a canonical set of optimal macroeconomic policies
to address the macroeconomic ills of appropriability. Those policies are not designed to
address other inefficiencies due to appropriability that arise at the macroeconomic level.
We define two types of canonical policies: creation incentives an, which are subsidies
added to the revenue of each new production unit; and protection subsidies U“, added to
the revenues of each pre-existing unit. Equilibrium in this case is determined as before, by
replacing ym in entry condition (14) by yn + on, and go in exit condition (16) by g“ + a“.
Proposition 7 (Dual Optimal Policy) Eficiency can be ~estored in an incomplete-contracts
equilibrium with the following combination of a creation incentive and a protection subsidy:
where li denotes the appropriating factor (i.e. A?i < 0),
The reason we need a dual policy approach even though there is only one ill — namely
quasi-rent appropriation — is that this ill affects different types of agents differently. There
are two types of marginal decisions in this economy: creation and destruction. The incen-
tives for creation are depressed by A, which must therefore be compensated for. At the
destruction margin for pre-existing units, the prospect of rent appropriation also distorts
the opportunity cost of the appropriating factor. But this distortion is only equal to the
17rents A times the probability A: that they will be captured. That distortion would be even
lower if the factor had to scrap some specific component upon separation. In any case, the
protection subsidy u“ * must therefore be lower than Un*.
What the need for two policy tools implies in practice is that, alone, a policy designed
to mend things on one margin will exacerbate things on the other. A creation incentive, by
itself, would exacerbate excessive destruction by increasing rents as well as the probability
of capturing those rents. A protection subsidy, by itself, would reduce destruction but make
the private factor costs of creation even higher. Only a combination of the two can restore
eficiency. 11
An application of this approach to the problem of managing macroeconomic adjustment
can be found in Caballero and Hammour (1996 b). In that paper, we argue that adjustment
must be managed through a combination of creation incentives and protection measures
for the existing structure. A purely gradualist approach, which can be thought of as a
single policy-instrument approach to slowing down creation, is deficient in that it does not
address — and actually exacerbates — the need to accelerate creation.
3 Business Cycles: Slack and Bottlenecks
In this section we analyze the effect of unprotected specificity on the economy’s response
to aggregate shocks. Although our simple setup does not allow a full dynamic analysis, it
yields important insights into the economy’s cyclical features. 12 We consider the effect of an
exogenous shock to gross revenues gn, which may either affect the economy’s “fundamen-
tals” or may be due to a distortion of the “aggregate demand” or “aggregate supply” type
(e.g., a tax on gross output). 13 We focus more closely on the capital/labor interpretation
of our two factors. For our purposes, the main distinguishing feature between capital and
labor is that the supply of (uncommitted) capital is relatively more elastic than labor.
Assumption 2 (Capital/Labor) The two factors are capital (k) and labor (1), We
llThere are many ways to implement the above “canonical” policies, taking into consideration the econ-
omy’s regulatory and institutional context in which they operate. For example, if new and pre-existing
units cannot be se~egated by policy, the above can be replaced by a production subsidy up and a creation
subsidyuc: UP* =Oo” anduc” =U”*– OP*.
12A dimension that our setup is ill designed for is the analysis of gross employment flows over the cycle,
which requires a full inter-temporal analysis. We examine this question in Caballero and Hammour (1994,
1996a).
13The shock may or may not affect the revenues ~ of pre-existing units. This would be relevant for an
analysis of gross flows over the cycle, which our setup is not designed to address.
18assume that uncommitted
exhibit some specificity:
capital is more elastic than labor, and that both capital and labor
?lk>~l; (24)
#k>O and @l>O. (25)
Unemployment and shortages
How do factor employment patterns evolve over the cycle? First, it is easy to show that,





More interestingly, the following proposition states that, as revenue and employment rise,
the economy turns from a situation where the labor market is segmented and Joint-
Production investment is the limiting factor for expansion to a situation where capital
is segmented and labor shortages are the limiting factor.
Proposition 8 (Unemployment and Shortages) There exists a level y“ b of revenues
yn that satisfies balanced-specificity condition (19). In an incomplete-contracts equilibrium,
ify” <ynb the lGbGrmarket is segmented; if yn > ynb the capital market is segmented.
Ynb corresponds to the level of revenues implicitly defined in proposition 2, at which there
is zero net appropriation and the incomplete-contracts economy is efficient. At levels of
activity below yn b capital is appropriated, while at levels higher than yn b labor is appro-
priated. As the economy expands and crosses the level of activity yn b, it turns from a
situation of involuntary labor unemployment and capital shortages for job-creation, to one
of labor-market shortages and segmentation in capital markets.
How should one interpret the possibility of segmented capital markets? It is a situation
where capital could obtain a higher return if invested in Joint Production but is unable
to find the requisite labor. 14 In terms of the stock-market valuation of Joint-Production
units, Tobin’s q is 1 when yn < yn b and greater than 1 when y“ > yn b (even though there
140ne expects contracting problems to be less severe when labor is appropriated than when capital is. The
reason is that labor is “inalienable, ” while capital is not. Thus, when labor is appropriated, some capital may
be transferred to the worker to convince him to commit to a production unit; when capital is appropriated,
the reverse transfer of labor to capital is infeasible. Although, in practice, this may not constitute a perfect
solution because of asymmetric information and other reasons, it gives reason to believe that capital-market
segment ation is more likely to be alleviated at the macroeconomic level than labor-market segment ation.
19are no explicit adjustment costs). Periods of labor-market shortages are times of expensive
stock-market valuations.
Although the level of revenues yn b seems arbitrary, we argue in section 4 that, in the
long run, institutional and technological evolution are likely to result in a situation where
Ynb is within the range of revenues in which the economy fluctuates. Institutions are likely
to respond to correct any imbalance in appropriation that cause macroeconomic inefficiency
to rise beyond a certain point; and technologies will also be developed that allow efficient
production with new factor proportions that reduce this imbalance. On both counts, one
does not expect yn b to be far removed in the long run from the economy’s average level of
output .
The next proposition characterizes the economy’s cyclical responsiveness at different
levels of activity.
Proposition 9 (Elastification/Rigidification)
tified” when the labor market is segmented, and
segmented:
( dE* /E*
The economy’s cyclical response is “elas-




if yn < ymb;
dy”/yn < dE*/E*
dyn/yn ‘
if yn > ynb.
(26)
When labor suffers from involuntary unemployment, the incomplete-contracts economy is
more responsive to shocks than an efficient economy; when labor is the short factor, the
economy’s cyclical response is more rigid than in the efficient case, Thus, appropriability
exacerbates recessions and brings about unnecessarily severe and involuntary unemploy-
ment, while it constrains expansions by creating labor shortages that prevent sufficient
investment in new jobs. The balanced-specificity level of employment Eb associated with
Ynb is analogous to the concept of a “natural rate.” It is the level of employment at which
the labor market functions effectively within the economy — it neither builds up the ex-
cessive slack of involuntary unemployment nor constitutes a bottleneck for the rest of the
economy.
An intuition for why proposition 9 holds can be drawn from the under-employment result
(proposition 3). As illustrated in figure 1, we know that when y“ = yn b employment in the
incomplete-contracts economy is equal to that in the efficient economy, while for yn # Ynb
nb 15 Thus ~ revenues expand and employment is lower than efficient on both sides of y .
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6’0 8“0 L“o 9“0 G-o *“O E“o 2“0 1“0 0“0cross yn b, employment first expands f~ter than in the efficient economy (to catch UP with
it) to the left of yn b, then expands slower (to fall short again) to the right of y“ b. On both
sides under-employment is due to one of the factors constraining employment of the other.
At low revenue levels it is capital — the more elmtic of the two factors — whose binding
free-entry condition constrains labor employment, and induces excessive elasticity in the
economy’s response; while at high revenue levels, it is labor — the less elastic factor — that
constrains growth and induces a rigid response.
Two interesting implications follow from proposition 9. The first is a simple application
of Jensen’s inequality. Because of the asymmetry in the economy’s cyclical responsiveness
at low and high levels of activity, an increase in the volatility of aggregate shocks around yn b
inefficiently lowers average Joint-Production employment and output. This “level” effect
can lead to high costs of macroeconomic instability.
Second, the economy will exhibit an asymmetric cyclical response to a symmetric shock
process. Figure 2 gives a stylized representation of the model’s implications for symmetric
~b 16 The two curves represent the sequence of (static) equi- cycle in revenues around y .
librium employment levels that correspond to each revenue level over the cycle, with the
curves’ averages shown as a straight line. The dashed curve represents the response of an
efficient economy, which is symmetric around the average employment level Eb. The solid
curve represents the response of the incomplete-contracts economy. It is asymmetric, with
excessive elasticity at low activity levels and excessive rigidity at high activity levels, and
exhibits lower average log-employment than the efficient economy. The resulting cyclical
pattern is reminiscent of asymmetries documented for the US business cycle, such as the
apparent asymmetry in the economy’s response to negative and positive oil-price shocks.
Sichel (1992), for example, characterizes post-war fluctuations in US output as consisting
of three phases: contractions, high-growth recoveries to pre-recession levels, and moderate-
growth periods. The corresponding pattern in figure 2 are the relatively sharp and short
recession-recovery phases below average E, and the shallow and more prolonged phase of
moderate expansion above it.
Stabilization policy
There is a strong case for trimming recessions in the presence of appropriability, irrespective
of whether the adverse shock affects fundamentals or is due to an aggregate distortion —
@k= 0.4, @l = 0.2.
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3i.e., whether it affects the “central planner” problem or not. When a shock to fundamentals
brings employment below Eb, proposition 7 indicates that the optimal response to labor
unemployment and sclerosis is to apply creation and employment intent ives. This is all the
more necessary in the presence of a distortionary shock, since an efficient economy should
not contract at all in that case.
The appropriate policy response during expansions is more ambiguous. If the shock is
distortionary, it should be stabilized. However, if the favorable shock is to fundamentals
and takes the economy beyond En b, proposition 7 again prescribes a combination of ex-
pansionary incentives that reduce the economy’s bottlenecks and allow it to expand beyond
its “natural” rate. Thus, while recessions are always inefficiently severe, expansions may
well be “golden opportunities” that call for reinforcement rather than stabilization. In
this sense, recessions should be systematically trimmed, while much greater care should be
taken not to curtail real opportunities for expansion.17
4 Institutional and Technological Evolution
In the short term, factors’ net specificity Ai varies mostly as a result of the general-
equilibrium response of Autarky prices to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Over the
medium and long term, however, institutional and technological forces are likely to directly
affect net specificity through changes in unitary specificity (the ~i ‘s) and through factor
substitution (z~/z~ ). This section explores
responses to the problem of appropriability.
4.1 An Institutional Balancing Act
the long-run institutional and technological
Institutions arise as the rules that govern the transactions between agents or groups of
agents. At the level of individual transactions between workers and firms, institutional
arrangements often arise as ways to improve efficiency by alleviating appropriability prob-
lems and “minimizing transactions costs.” Institutions also develop to regulate interactions
between “coalitions” of labor and capital owners, be it at the level of corporate governance
(e.g., firm-union bargaining or corporatist representation) or at the political level through
the legal and regulatory environment (e.g., right-to-strike or severance-pay legislation). In
I’See De Long and Summers (1988), e.g., for a related view of business cycles as “repeated transient
and potentially avoidable lapses from sustainablelevels of output” and of good policy as aiming to “filling
troughs without shaving peaks” (p. 438).
22this function, institutions can play a distributional as well as an efficiency role, and embody
the entrenched interests of different groups.la
This section tries to account for the labor and capital interest-group incentives to develop
institutions that affect their mutual “specificity.” Although interest groups may be strongly
driven by distributional concerns, we argue that the institutional outcome is unlikely to drift
very far from balanced specificity.
The politics of capital and labor
Institutional arrangements can reinforce the effective specificity of one factor with respect
to another by allocating rights (e.g., the right not to lose one’s job “without cause”) or
by making otherwise femible contracts unenforceable (e.g., the unenforceability of worker
commitment to long-term employment contracts). In order to capture this institutional
dimension of specificity, we think of the ~i’s as having an institutional component which
is, to a large extent, a political choice variable. We analyze different groups’ interest in
changing the ~i ‘s.
Since institutions typically take time to evolve, at this stage we think of the single
period in our model as representing the long nn. We view this “long run” as an attractor
that pulls evolutionary forces. From this perspective, initial conditions matter less and we
may assume that there are no pre-existing units:lg
Assumption 3 (Long Run) There are no pre-ezisting units: EO = O.
In order to get to the
gregate income of each of
incentives of different interest-groups, we denote by Wi the ag-
the factors. Under assumption 3, it is easy to see that
Wi = W~Ei +pi(l – Ei), i = 1, k. (27)
The first term is the income of units of factor i engaged in Joint Production, and the
20 The interest of factor i as a whole is to second term is the income of units in Autarky.
IsRecent analyses of the politics of institutional development include Robinson (1995, 1996), who analyzes
the politics of labor-market institutions; and Roe (1994), who gives a political interpretation to the origins
of US corporate governance arrangements.
19ThW we view pr~e~sting ~nit~ as powerfd enough to affect the time and speed at which institutions
evolve and, perhaps, the precise limit to which institutions converge, but not powerful enough to change
the basic course of long-run institutional developments.
ZO~l + Wk do not add up to aggregate income w as defined in (23). The difference corresponds to ‘he
income ~i=l,k Fi (Ui) – pi Ui that accrues the “shadow” factor implicit in our decreasing-returns assumption
on the Autarky production functions Fi(Ui). We do not consider the political incentives of this third
“factor.”
23maximize Wi, but there are distributional issues within each group in the presence of market
segmentation. The argument for maximizing Wi in the “long run” is that it represents the
factor’s unconditional expected income. 21 We also analyze the ez post incentives of factor
owners in Joint Production and Autarky.
Proposition 10 (Interest Groups) For each factor i = 1, k, consider the problem of
finding the pairs (#1, #k) E [0, 1]2 that maximize the ex ante aggregate factor income W~
arising in the corresponding incomplete-contracts equilibrium.
(i) There is a line segment that crosses the parameter space (@l, ok) E [0, 1]2 and along
which any point maximizes Wa. To all points on that segment there corresponds a unique
measure A = ~[il >0 oj net effective specificityy in favor of factor i, and a unique level of
Joint-Production employment E = 21il.
(ii) A unit of factor i employed ex post in Autarky receives pi, which is maximized
for any pair (41, ~k) l [0, 1]2 that yields an eficient equilibrium; while a unit of factor i
employed ex post in Joint Production receives w;, which always increases with ~~i and falls
with da.
The first part of this proposition states that each factor i, as a whole, would choose an
institutional arrangement that creates ir. equilibrium netspecificity ~Iil z O in its favor.
The factor has an incentive to capture rents at the cost of a socially less efficient macroe-
conomic outcome. There is, in fact, a whole line in (@l, ~k)-space that yields any desired
level of net specificity (recall that Ai = @ipixi – d~ip~ix~t ). The different configurations
along this line may correspond to widely different degrees of institutional “rigidity” — i.e.,
different abilities to accommodate in the short run changes in the macroeconomic environ-
ment. It is not difficult to conceive of situations where the historical evolution process does
not lead to the most “flexible” configurate ion — i.e., the configuration with the lowest ~1
and ~k.
The political incentive for each factor to appropriate rents has its limits. The reason for
this is stated in the second part of the proposition. Inherently, a factor’s attempt to capture
rents results in own-market segmentation, and creates winners and losers within the interest
group. The winners are “insiders” employed in Joint Production, whose ez post incentive
21we ~~~ume that interest ~roupS~eco~nize the general- equzlibtiu~ impact (on ~i’s and ~~‘S) of ‘heir
political choices. Although “partial-equilibrium myopia” can undoubtedly play an important role in the
political process, our assumption captures the idea that interest groups will partly anticipate and partly
adjust to the general-equilibrium consequences of their choices.
24from rent appropriation is unlimited; the losers are “outsiders” who remain in Autarky, and
whose ez post incentive is to minimize macroeconomic inefficiency. It is therefore through
the internal segmentation of the appropriating factor that macroeconomic efficiency enters
its ez ante objective function and limits its incentive for rent appropriation.
The degree to which institutions can deviate from balanced specificity is therefore
bounded. If in the long run political power lies with ez ante interest groups, ~[~1 and
~1~1 represent upper bounds on capital’s and labor’s long-run net specificity. Beyond those
limits, both factors would attempt to reduce the degree of appropriation in the economy.zz
It is in this sense that we expect institutional forces to perform a “balancing act,” and keep
the economy from deviating too far away from balanced specificity.
Institutional rigidity
Institutions are slow to evolve and adapt, and they often react to crises rather than antic-
ipate them. Even though large and persistent changes in the macroeconomic environment
would eventually lead to institutional adjustment, in the meantime it is proposition 8
(unemployment/shortages) that determines the fortunes of different factors of production.
Suppose, for example, that the political outcome leads to a situation of balanced specificity
for a certain expected level of yn. If realized yn is less than expected, the labor market
will be segmented; and if realized yn is more than expected, the capital market will be
segmented.
This mismatch between the frequency at which institutions react and that at which
shocks occur, together with our analysis of the incomplete-contracts economy’s response
to shocks, naturally fits with accounts of European macroeconomic performance in the
postwar period. The European experience in the fifties and sixties was one where vigorous
growth (high yn) allowed the development of welfare-state institutions that benefited labor
in its relationship with capital (high ~~) without much cost in terms of unemployment or
resistance on the part of capital. In fact Europe exhibited signs of labor shortages during
that period, which necessitated a substantial flow of immigrant labor. The seventies and
eighties were a period of negative aggregate shocks, often contractionary policy, and produc-
tivity slowdown (volatile and low yn). The institutions that evolved after the war became
a burden on the labor market and gave rise to a serious unemployment problem (proposi-
22Becker t 1983) ~rovide~ another ~r~ument Why a highly inefficient pOlitiCal outcome is unlikely ‘0 persist J
in an analysis that attempts to unify the view that government favors interest groups with the view that
government corrects market failures. Taking an economic approach to political behavior, he argues that
pressure groups benefiting from activities that raise efficiency have an intrinsic advantage in the competition
for irdluence over ~oups harmed by those activities, and therefore will lobby more effectively for efficiency.
25tion 8). The institutional framework has responded, but quite slowly as it faced resistance
from secure “insiders.” Unions, for example, are today much weaker than they used to be.
Technology also seems to have adjusted with substantial capital-labor substitution, a point
we come to in the next section. In the meantime, proposition 7 recommends introducing
large job-creation incentives, while the requisite “protection subsidies” are probably more
than provided for by existing job-protection legislation (which, unlike pure subsidies, have
the unfortunate effect of effectively increasing capital specificity) .23
4.2 Technological Development: Factor Exclusion and Withdrawal
Although fixed in the short run, technology is a major dimension along which production
units can adapt to the appropriability problem. In this respect, a central mpect of tech-
nology is relative factor intensity, Even though available technologies may allow limited
factor substitution in the short run, new technologies can be developed that allow a broader
menu of factor intensities. In this paper, we consider an extreme form of this dichotomy,
and assume fixed proportions in the short run and infinite elasticity of substitution in the
long run. This section asks the question, how will technology choice respond to the appro-
priability problem, and how will that response in turn affect macroeconomic equilibrium?
Our analysis can also be used to shed light on the consequences of allowing some factor
substitution in the short run.
Technological possibilities
From a long-run perspective, we assume a technological menu characterized by a constant-
returns function yn (Zk, xl ) that essentially relates productivity to relative factor intensity;
and a function ~i (Zk, Zl), i = k, 1, that is homogeneous of degree zero and relates unitary
specificity to relative factor intensity (see below). In the short run, Zk and Z[ are fixed,
so ~n and ~i are fixed; in the long run, those variables result from technology choice and
development. We assume the following functional forms.
Assumption 4 (Technological Menu) The long-run technological menu is characterized
bg
yn(z~, z[) = ~a(zk + Zl), a>O;
23some ~ountrie~have opted for increased unemployment benefits, which amounts to subsidizing the ‘eg-
mented factor’s Autarky sector and exacerbates the approprial.rility problem. This mechanism, it is argued,
may have played an important role in the persistence of European unemployment (see, e.g., Blanchard and
Jimeno 1995 and Ball 1996).
26The long-run technological menu ~n(~k, zl) for production is linear, which captures
maximum possibilities of long-run factor substitution. Because of constant returns the size
of production units is immaterial, so an appropriate normalization allows us to identify a
technology by its embodied capital/labor ratio.
Unitary specificity ~i(~k, zr) also depends on technology and is a function of the capi-
tal/labor ratio. If a unit of capital, for example, works with more labor, it is likely to be
more specialized with respect to the latter. The presumption is thus that the degree to
which each unit of capital is specific to labor increases with the technology’s labor intensity.
The strength of this effect is captured by the parameter p. As an example, consider the
possibility of substituting generic machines for specifically trained workers. Capital speci-
ficity arises if the firm finances workers’ relationship-specific training. As machines are
substituted for workers, the share #~ of specific training in total capital investment falls.
An institutional example arises when capital specificity derives from legislated severance
pay. If severance pay is fixed in monetary terms, it effectively makes ~k proportional to the
labor/capital ratio.24
Our presentation does not aim at full generality, but focuses on selected cases that are
indicative of the mechanisms likely to be at work more generally. With this in mind, we
replace assumptions 1 and 2 with assumption 1‘/2’:
Assumption 1’/2’ (Parameter Configuration) We ~estrict our analysis to the follow-
ing parameter configurations: (i) as 1; (ii) ~k = ql = q> O; and (iii) p ~ {O, 1}.
The upper-bound (i) on the productivity parameter a guarantees that equilibrium with
technology choice is an intetior equilibrium. The elasticity-based distinction between cap-
ital and labor is not central to the results in this section, and ~sumption (ii) simplifies
things by assuming that both factors have equal elmticity q. Assumption (iii) restricts the
parameter p in the unitary-specificity function ~~(Zk, z~) to two values, 1 or 0, We take
the first value, for which unitary specificity does depend on relative factor use, as our base
case. Specifically, the functional form implies, for example, that total capital specificity
+k(zk, Zl)zk is proportional to total labor use xl (i.e., ~k(~~, ~~)~k = j~z~), as would indi-
cate our training and severance-pay examples above. We contrast this with the case p = O,
24Another reason why efiectiue specificity may depend on factor proportions is that relative bargaining
strength may not be independent of the capital/labor ratio either.
27where unit ary specificityy does not depend on relative factor use.
Equilibrium with technology choice
How is equilibrium determined with technology choice? Suppose temporarily that any
point on the technology menu were available. Then each factor would select the technology
that maximizes its factor income in Joint Production, subject to the other factor being
willing to participate. In other words, Zi units of factor z would choose
(28)
where ‘W~(Zk, Z~) and ~~~(~k, Z1) are given by (8)-(9). As we discuss below, optimization
together with equilibrium free entry determine the technology that new production units
. if given the choice — would select from the technological menu. The question is, will
that technology be actually developed? We do not model in any detail the process of
technological development and adoption. Instead, we rely on a simple long-run principle:
if there is unanimity in all new production relationships about a single technology, then
that technology will be developed. Since all new production relationships in our model
are identical, they would select the same technology and, according to the “unanimity”
principle, that technology will be developed.
With this in mind, we define an (interior) incomplete-contracts equilibrium with tech-
0, that satisfy nology choice asa set of variables (XI, XZ, C, E, El, E2, PI, P21 w~~ w~~ ~
tethnology-choice problems (28), the normalization Z1 = 1, as well as the conditions for
an (interior) incomplete-contracts equilibrium, We define an (interior) efficient equilibrium
with technology choice in the same manner.
As stated in proposition 13 below, there will still be some parameter configurations for
which specificity is balanced in equilibrium and other configurations for which one of the
factors appropriates the other and experiences market segmentation. Section 6.5 of the
appendix shows that, in the first case, technology is determined in equilibrium by the joint
jree-ent~ conditions of the two factors (the first-order conditions for (28) generally serving
to identify the constraints’ shadow price). In the second case, technology is determined by
the first-order condition of the appropriated factor:
Proposition 11 (Appropriate ion and Technology) Suppose that factor i is appropri-
ated (i. e., Ai > O) in an incomplete-contracts equilibrium with technology choice. Then the
28equilibrium choice of technology Xk/xl is determined exclusively by factor i‘s unconstrained
optimization problem maxz.i~o{w~ (Zk, xl)z~ }, given equilibrium pk and P1.
The intuition behind proposition 11 is simple. Since its free-entry condition holds with
equality, the appropriated factor i breaks even with its optimal technology and would
suffer a loss with any other technology. The other factor has therefore no choice but to
accept factor i’s preferred technology. 25 Although different in that it is purely a market-
equilibrium outcome, this result is akin to the idea in the property-rights literature that
control rights are often optimally deposited with the agent who must make the largest
specific investment (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart 1986; Dow 1993).
Before characterizing equilibrium with technology choice, we address the question of
existence and uniqueness:
Proposition 1’ (Existence and Uniqueness) An incomplete-contracts equilibrium with
technology choice exists, is unique, and satisfies C, Ei, Ua > 0, z = 1,2. An eficient
equilibrium with technology choice exists, is unique, and satisjies C*, E,*, Uz~>0, i = 1,2,
Exclusion and withdrawal
The problem of appropriability can cause an inefficient technology to be chosen. It is simple
to see that, because we have assumed full symmetry between the two factors, the efficient
choice of technology h= Zk/Xl = 1. With incomplete contracts, this capital/labor ratio is
generally distorted:
Proposition 12 (Exclusion and Withdrawal) Suppose the economy initially has bal-
anced specificity and the eficient technology xk/x[ = 1. An institutional shifi against
factor i takes place, causing ~i > $-i. Define the “short-run” response (superscript “s.T.”)
as the incomplete-contracts equilibrium outcome
‘(long-run” response (superscript ‘1.r. ”) as the
with technology choice.
(i) If p = 1, then





~1.r. > ~:tr. .
12
(Zk/X~ = 1); and the
equilibrium outcome
zsTechnicallY, ,,cou~traint qualification>! is not satisfied for factor =i’s optimization problem. The ~soci-
ated first-order condition is thel-efol-enot necessary,
29Let factor z (capital, for concreteness) experience a detrimental shift in specificity pa-
rameters — i.e., a increase in ~i or a decrease ~~i. From proposition 3, we know that the
short-run response with fixed technology is under-employment: E~”T. and E~~~”are lower
than efficient and the capital/labor ratio ZjT /zU~ = 1 remains fixed. In the long run, an
inefficient technology will be chosen. In the base case p = 1, capital will be substituted for
labor leading to an inefficiently high capital/labor ratio Z~T/Z~. The partial “exclusion”
of labor from Joint Production exacerbates its under-employment (E~~ < E~l~), and can
~,r, > Ef.~.) . also be shown to alleviate the underemployment of capital (Ei 26 Excluding
labor helps reduce the net specificity of each unit of capital, and reduce appropriable rents.
By contrast, if unitary specificity did not depend on relative factor use, as is the case when
p = O, then the opposite would happen. The capital/labor ratio would be inefficiently low,
as capital “withdraws” from Joint Production in an attempt to capture a bigger piece of
quasi-rents per own unit.
The rationale behind exclusion and withdrawal in proposition 12 can be made clearer if
we use the accounting identity yn = ~~~k + w~z~ together with (21) to rewrite the objective
function in (28) for appropriated factor z as
where Ai (~k, Zl) is given by (13). The first term expresses i’s objective function from a
social point of view (i.e., based on the other fact or’s social shadow cost p~i); the second
term — net effective specificity — captures the private distortion to that objective function
due to rent appropriation. How does the second term distort the resulting technology? If
p = 1, it is easy to see that the effect of changing factor proportions on net specificity is
given by dAi/dzTi >0. Excluding the other factor helps reduce net effective specificity. If
p = O, the opposite would hold. In both cases rent appropriation is reduced, but replaced
by a problem of distorted capital/labor ratio.
This analysis of the technological response to rent appropriation can shed light on some
aspects of high unemployment in Europe. The rise of unemployment in the 1970s is gener-
ally considered a result of oil shocks and of the productivity slowdown on economies that
had developed labor-market institutions better adapted to an era of rapid growth. Wage
z61n fact with our ~~~umption of infinite elasticity of factor substitution, technology choice will cause
capital to ~e over-employed compared to the efficient outcome. But this result is not robust, and would
disappear for lower elasticities of substitution,
30resistance to adjustment caused an increase in the labor share of national incomes and a
contraction in employment. In the 1980s the labor share reversed its course and declined
sharply, but unemployment kept rising (see, e.g., Blanchard and Katz 1996). The labor
share of value added in French manufacturing, for example, rose from 61 to 68 percent in
the 1970s, but then declined to 58 percent by the end of the 1980s. One plausible driving
force behind this phenomenon is a technological response to appropriability characterized
by labor exclusion: As capital is substituted for labor, the labor share declines while un-
employment rises. Looking again at the example of France, one finds evidence of strong
capital/labor substitution. Between 1970 and 1990, the capital/labor ratio in French man-
ufacturing increased by 122 percent versus 88 percent in the US. Normalized by the capital
labor ratio in the trade sector, the increase was 25 percent in France versus 8 percent in
the US.27
Balanced-specificity region
As does institutional development, the introduction of technologies with new factor-intensity
characteristics may help balance specificity and eliminate market segmentation in the long
run. The following proposition characterizes the region in the space of specificity parameters
(~~,?l) in which effective specificity is balanced with technology choice.
Proposition 13 (Balanced-Specificity Region) For the incomplete-contracts equilib-
rium with technology choice, define the “eficient” set & ~ [0, 1)2 as the set of parame-
ters (~k, ~1) for which equilibrium is eflcient; and define the “balanced-specificity” set B
~ [O,1)2 as the set of parameters (~k, 71) for which A = O in equilibrium.
(i) The eficient set& is the line ~k = ~l;
(ii) The balanced-specificity set includes, but is not generally equal to, the eficient set:
If q > 1, then & c B c [0, 1)2; if q S 1, then & = BIP=I C f31p=0 C [0, 1)2 (where “c”
denotes strict inclusion).
Statement (i) of the proposition identifies the efficient set & with the line ~~ = @l, which
is intuitive since we have assumed everything else to be symmetric for the two factors.
From proposition 2, we know that with fixed technology the balanced-specificity set would
also correspond to a line. In the long run, technology choice can expand the possibilities of
Z7Another piece of evidence on labor shares that is consistent with the exclusion effect is the strong negative
correlation observed between wage premia and the labor share of value added in US industry (see Krueger
and Summers 1988, and Katz and Summers 1989). If part of the wage premium reflects specific quasi-rents,
the associated low labor share may be the result of a labor exclusion response to rent appropriation,
31balanced specificity and turn the line into a broader cone, illustrated in figure 3.28 As stated
in (ii), the balanced-specificity set ~ with technology choice can generally cover a region
broader than the efficient line t. The reason is that A can be reduced to zero through the
adoption of technologies with suboptimal relative factor intensities. Technology choice is
therefore another reason why analyzing the economy near a balanced-specificity point can
be reasonable.
However, there are limits to the degree to which factor substitution allows specificity to
be balanced in equilibrium. Going back to the objective function (29), using factor substi-
tution to reduce rent appropriation Ai is costly for the efficiency term yn (Zk, Zl ) – P-ix=i.
As factor substitution is relied on to offset appropriation, there may come a point where
the resulting marginal inefficiency is greater than the marginal reduction in appropria-
tion. For this reason the set f3 does not generally cover the full parameter space. Market
segmentation can arise even with an infinite elasticity of factor substitution.
There is a sense in which balancing specificity is more difficult with factor exclusion than
with withdrawal. This is because general-equilibrium forces offset the partial-equilibrium
rebalancing effect of exclusion when P = 1, while they reinforce the effect of withdrawal
when p = O. Taking into account the general-equilibrium variables that determine net
effective specificity Ai (Zk, Tl; Pk, pl) in (13), it is straightforward to see that 8Ai/8pi > 0
and dAi/dp~i <0. Thus, if z is the appropriated factor, the general-equilibrium effect of
exclusion, which causes pi to rise and p-i to fall, is to increase Ai and partly offset its
partial equilibrium effect when P = 1. The general equilibrium effect of withdrawal on Pi
and p=i is the opposite, and helps reduce Ai further when p = O. Thus the former results
in greater distortions in factor intensity than the latter.
A measure of the strength of the general equilibrium effect of exclusion on relative
prices is how low the elasticity q of factor supplies is. 29 Consider the base case P = 1. As
the proposition states, when q > 1, the balanced-specificity region B is great er than the
efficient line &; but when q ~ 1, region B coincides with &. The strong general-equilibrium
effect eliminates any possibility of balancing specificity outside the efficient line. In fact
one can show that, in the case q s 1,the exclusion effect actually worsens segmentation of
the appropriating factor =i outside the efficient line, i.e. u~- – p~ > w~~ – PIJ in the
notation of proposition 12. This is because, by (20), segmentation is equal to A/Z~i, which
Z8Figure 3 ~a~ generated with q = 1.5 and P = 1-
Z9Moregenerally,if ~k # ~L,the relevant measure of the strength of the general-equili~ l”ium effect is ‘ow
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0“1 6“0 9“0 L“o 9“0 S“o ti”o C“o 2“0 1’0 0“0can rise when a strong general-equilibrium effect necessitates a great degree of exclusion
(i.e., reduction ofz_~)to decrease A. Thus, exclusion of theappropriating factor through
technology choice not only leads to greater under-employment for that factor, but may also
lead to greater factor segmentation.
5 Conclusion
The prevalence of specificity in economic relationships makes rent appropriation a prime
suspect for a wide range of economic ills. In this paper we have tried to provide a simple,
synthetic characterization of the multidimensional macroeconomic problem it gives rise to.
Why do economies waste unemployed resources during recessions? Why is there in-
voluntary unemployment and labor market segmentation at all? Why do some economies
“over-heat” at even modest levels of growth? Why do countries build social institutions that
are later perceived as obstacles to flexible adjustment? Why do some countries seem stuck
with a highly outdated productive structure? Why is the massive destruction of reforming
countries’ old productive systems not matched by immediate and significant creation? Why
are methods of production (e.g., capital/labor ratios) so different across economies that are,
otherwise, at a similar stage of development? Why do poor countries with cheap labor so
often fail to attract capital and grow?
It is certainly not inconceivable that part of the answer to those apparently disconnected
questions could be traced back to appropriable quasi-rents. As this paper argues, each of
the phenomena those questions touch upon may reflect a different aspect of the economy’s
general-equilibrium response to widespread opportunism.
336 Appendix
6.1 Construction of Equilibrium in Section 2
This section derives a constructive characterization of incomplete-contracts and efficient
equilibria that will prove useful in what follows. An incomplete-contracts equilibrium is
constructed in the following manner. First use equations (3) and (6) to define functions
p2(E) = (z2E)1/~’ , i = 1,2, (30)
that give pi = pa(E) in equilibrium. fii (E) is continuous, strictly increasing, and takes
values fii (0) = O and ~i (+m) = +w. Now free-entry condition (14), which is equivalent to
(12), can be written as
Given that O S ~j S 1, j = 1,2, it is clear that the function j(E) inherits the above
properties of ~i(E): it is continuous, strictly increasing, and takes values f(0) = O and
j(+m) = +m. Since Yn >0, this implies that free-entry condition (31) taken with equality
yields a unique positive value of E. It is easy to check that the other equilibrium variables
(C,E,,~z,PI,Pz,~?,~8,U 0, are determined uniquely as a function of E from the remaining
equilibrium conditions.
Free-entry condition (14) can also be thought of as relating employment E = E(A) to
net specificity — a relation that will prove useful. The function E(A) is implicitly defined
by
9“ = ~l(fi)zl + P2(fi)z2 + A.
It is continuous and strictly decreasing,
An eficient equilibrium corresponds to an incomplete-contracts equilibrium with a con-
figuration of (@l, 42) that yields A = O (which includes the configuration ~1 = 42 = O).
To see this, one can first easily check that the definition of an efficient equilibrium corre-
sponds to that of an incomplete-contracts equilibrium if A = O. In particular, the function
E(A) defined above takes value E* when A = O. Conversely, A = O is necessary for an
34incomplete-contracts equilibrium to be efficient because, since E(A) is strictly decreasing,
E(A) # E“ if A # O.
6.2 Proofs of Propositions in Section 2
Proof of proposition 1: The existence and uniqueness of an incomplete-contracts equi-
librium was shown by construction in section 6.1. It was also shown that an efficient
equilibrium corresponds to an incomplete-contracts equilibrium with ~1 = ~z = O (among
other possible (@l, @z)-configurations), which therefore guarantees existence and unique-
ness. It remains to be shown that C, E~, U~,> 0, i = 1,2 (C*, E;, U: >0 follows by setting
~1 =+2 =0).
First, we show that C > 0, for which, by (2), it is sufficient to show that E > E“.
Define the function
One can easily show that g(E) > f(E) (defined in (31)) and g’(E), j’(E) > 0, for all
E. Since .ZE is defined in assumption 1 as the solution to y“ = g(~E) and equilibrium
employment is the solution to yn = f(E), we must have ZE < E. Thus E“ < ZE in
assumption 1 implies E“ < E.
Second, Ei = ZiE >0 follows from E >0, which was shown in section 6.1. Third, to
show that Ui = 1 – Ei > 0, we show that Zg in assumption 1 is the minimum value of y“
for which the eficient equilibrium exhibits zero Autarky employment (Ei = 1) for one of
the factors. To see this, note that, by substituting (30) in (10) (taken with equality), the
minimum y“ for which E: = 1 is
ZV is simply the minimum of the above expression for i = 1,2. Thus yn < ZV in assumption
1 implies E: < 1. Since proposition 3 (proved below) states that Ei s E;, this implies
Ez<l. n
Proof of proposition 2: The first part of the proposition — that an incomplete-contracts
equilibrium is efficient iff A = O — was proved in section 6.1. What we still need to show
is that this is equivalent to parameter condition (19). Solving (10) and (18) simultaneously




If we replace this expression for pi in (6) and use the fact that E1/zl = E2/zz (see equation
(3)), we obtain condition (19) in the proposition. q
Proof of proposition 3: Recall from section 6.1 that E = E(A) in equilibrium, and
that ~(A) <0 and E(O) = E*. This implies that an inefficient incomplete-contracts
equilibrium, in which A >0 by proposition 2, must have E = S(A) < E(O) = E*. By (3),
this implies that Ei < E:, z = 1,2. q
Proofs of propositions 4 and 5: Given in the main text.
Proof of proposition 6: Differentiating (23) with respect to C and y“ yields —
aw
— = y“ –plxl – p2x2;
ac
By (14) taken with equality, the first expression is equal to A, which is positive in an
inefficient equilibrium (by proposition 2). By (16), the second expression is equal to
–D’(~O) [Al (w; – pl) + A2 (w; – p2)], which is negative in an inefficient equilibrium (by
proposition 4 and Al, A2 > O). q
Proof of proposition 7: Taking (21) into account, the equilibrium entry and exit con-
ditions with subsidies are
yn + a“ =plzl +p2z2 + A;
y“ + o“ = plzl +p2z2 + A.iA, —
where =i denotes the appropriating factor. Substituting the efficient entry and exit condi-
tions ((10) with equality and (17)) for y“ and y“ in the formulae above, and replacing an —
and uO for their proposed expressions, transforms the equilibrium conditions into
O = (pI – p~)zI + (P2 – p~)z2 + (A – A*),
o = (pl –P:)zI + (P2 –P3)z2 + (A.iA – ~:iA*),
which are obviously satisfied for E = E*. ￿l
366.3 Proofs of Propositions in Section 3
Proof of proposition 8: From condition (19) for efficiency, we solve for ynb:
To determine which factor is segmented, rewrite (13) in terms of functions (30): Ak =
~kZk~k(E) – ~lZl~l(E). By differentiating this expression at a point where Ak = O, we get
which is negative given that qk > ql. Noting that E is an increasing function of yn (which
follows immediately from equation yn = f(E) in section 6.1), and that Ak = Oat the unique
value for yn = yn b, we get Ak >0 (i.e., the labor market is segmented by proposition 4)
when yn < yn b; and Ak <0 (i.e., the capital market is segmented) when ym > yn b. ￿l
Proof of proposition 9: Suppose that yn # yn b and that i is the appropriated factor.
Then free-entry condition (12) holds with equality for factor i. Substituting functions (30)
for the pj’s and totally differentiating with respect to E and yn, we get
dyn 1
dE
— = ; [;(1 + @i)Pi~i + ;(1 – d.i)p.iz.i y.
Y“ .
The corresponding equation for the efficient equilibrium is obtained by setting ~i = 4T; = O.
Comparing those two equations, it is clear that
~$ ~ dE*/E ~ _ dE/E
dy”/yn < ‘Yn = dyn/yn
if and only if
which, after a few algebraic steps, is equivalent to
(k-;)b:, - (1- 4-i)P=il ~-~> ; [(1+ 4i)Pi~i + (1 - 41i)P1i~7i - p;~i - P:zz>i] = 0.
(32)
The right-hand side of the above inequality is zero, because it is equal to the difference
37between the right-hand sides of the inefficient and efficient free-entry conditions, (14) and
(10). The sign of the left-hand side is the sign of l/q_i – I/q;, since E1i > E-i (proposition
3) implies P<i > p-i by (30). Thus, if appropriated factor z iS caPital — i-e ~ labor iS
segmented — then ~-i < ~i, inequality (32) holds, and <f; < C;”; if, On the contrarY!
capital is segmented, then q-i > qi and ~~~”> ~~~. q
6.4 Proof of the Proposition in Section 4.1
Proof of proposition 10: (z) Factor i’ aggregate income (27) can be written as a function
of the other factor’s net specificity Ai:
W.(A=i) = max{A_~,O}z~~ (lA=il) +fiz (~(lA-ii)) ,
taking into account (3), (21), and the definitions of pi(.) and ~ (.) in section 6.1. Since
~ > 0 and 5 < 0, it is clear that Wi(0) > Wi(A~i) for any A-i < 0. SO Wi(A=i) is
maximized for a non-negative value ~~{ of A-i — i.e., net effective specificity in favor of
factor i. By definition (13),
which defines a line in parameter space if we fix A7i = ~~~.
(ii) For a unit of factor i employed in Autarky, ex-post income pi = pi (E(lA1il)) ‘s
maximized at the efficient value of A-Z = O, again because fli > 0 and ~’ < 0. For a unit
employed in Joint Production, we show that ez-post income w? is always increasing with
A-i (which, it is easy to see from (33), is increasing with ~Ti and decreasing with ~i). If
A?a <0, we know by proposition 4 that W? = pi = ~i (~(lAil)), whichincreases withAi
when the latter is negative. If A~a 20, we know by proposition 4 that w~a = p~i. Using
(
the accounting identity yn = w~xi + w~ix~i, we write W; = Yn – p-i (~ (lA=il))‘-i) /zi,
which is always increasing with A_i when the latter is non-negative. q
6.5 Mathematical Appendix to Section 4.2
This appendix provides a proof for propositions 11, 12, 13, and 1’, in that order. Equilibrium
with technology choice involves an additional endogenous variable Zk/Zl (equilibrium Z1
being normalized to 1) and optimization problem (28) for factors i = k, 1. If the constraint
qualification condition is satisfied for this problem — i.e., w~i (Z~, xl) > p-i for some feasible
38value of z-i — then the following first-order condition is necessary:
a (W;xi) aw:i
dz., + “’G
= O and ~i (w~i –pi) = O, for some ai >0. (34)
We divide the parameter space (~~, ~1) l [0,1) into three sets: d~, z = k, 1, corre-
sponds to parameter configurations for which factor i is appropriated (i.e., A~ > O) in the
incomplete-contracts equilibrium with technology choice; B corresponds to parameters for
which equilibrium is characterized by balanced specificity (A = O).
Proof of Proposition 11: Suppose (Tk, 71) l Ai. Proposition 4 shows that, with the
equilibrium technology Z/c/Xl, factor Z’S market clears and factor -Z ‘S market is segmented.
This means that the constraint w~i > p-i to factor i’s technology-choice problem (28) is
not binding in equilibrium. First-order condition (34) becomes
~zi =;[;-Pdi(:)’-”Pi-(l-(l-u,7.i(:)p)P12] =0, (35,
a (W;zi)
taking (8)- (9) and assumption 4 into account. It determines tethnology Zk/Zl given equi-
librium pk and pl.
Is this technology consistent with factor -i’s technology choice problem? Since factor
Z’S market clears (w2 — pi = O) at this (unconstrained) optimum technology, no other
technology can yield a positive value for w? –pi. Therefore constraint qualification for factor
=i’s problem does not hold, and the associated first-order conditions are not necessary. q
We can now determine equilibrium quantities (and prices) in regions dk, dk, and B.
Suppose (@k, ~1) ~ &. Given technology, equilibrium employment is determined — as in
section 2 — by appropriated factor i’s free-entry condition. Multiplying each side of (14)
(taken with equality) by E after taking assumption 4 into account, and using (3) and (6),
yields
( (2)”) E~+’’’+~1i(2)”)E~~ ””~””- ’36)
~(Ei+E.i)= l+@i
Since (3) implies Z~/Z~~ = Ei/E~z, (35) and (36) can be solved simultaneously to yield
equilibrium quantities in region ~:
(37)
39Suppose now that (dk, ~1) l B. The two factors’ free-entry conditions hold then with
equality (and are equivalent). They can be used to determine equilibrium quantities Ek
and El. Multiplying both sides of the balanced-specificity condition ~kpkxk = @tplzl by E,
and taking (3), (6), and wsumption 4 into account, we get
[
(~7i/~i) 1+1:.-2., ——
if ~i~.i # O and 1 + I/q – 2P # O,
Ei/E.a = @i, where ~i =
1, otherwise,
(38)
for z = k, 1.30 We can use this expression to solve for Ei in free-entry condition (14) (taken
with equality and A = O), again after multiplying both sides by E and taking (3), (6), and
assumption 4 into account:
‘i=(~l:;::,q)’ ‘=k7z-
(39)
Because the constraints to technology choice problem (28) are binding in f?, the as-
sociated first-order conditions (34) determine the constraints’ shadow prices a~. For the
first-order conditions to hold, we need to check that ~i 20. Since the line ~k = ~1 is always
in B, it is sufficient by continuity to check ~i >0 on that line. TO do SO,we use expression
(35) for ~(w~Zi)/dZTi and a similarly derived expression for ~w~i/~x_i:
Since both factors are symmetric when $k = $1, it is e~y to see — using a/2 = Pi = P~i
under symmetry (by (14) with A = O) — that
in that case. It follows immediately from (34) that a~ 20.
Proof of proposition 12: Suppose parameters shift against factor z so that ~i > ~~i.






E:T- = E;; =
2+~i–J~~ “
(40)The proof of the proposition follows directly from comparing (40) with (37) if (~~, @l) l Ai,
and with (38)-(39) if (~~, @l) l B. q
We now characterize the boundaries that delimit the different regions in parameter
space. We start by determining all the “smooth” boundaries — i.e., boundaries at which
equilibrium variables are continuous functions of the parameters (j~, ~1). Note first that
any point that smoothly separates Ak and Al must be included in B (otherwise the flip in
factor-market segmentation would involve a discontinuity). We can therefore restrict our
attention to smooth boundaries that separate region 23from regions 4, z = k, 1.
At any point (~k, ~1) along such a boundary, equilibrium must satisfy equations (37)
and (39) simultaneously. Equating Ei/ETi as determined by each of those two equations,
a smooth boundary must satisfy
= long as ~i~=i # O and 1+ l/q – 2p # O (otherwise it must satisfy the continuous extension
?a = ~~i = O). In the space of parameters (j~, jl) l [0, 1), such a boundary starts at the
origin and must remain on the side of the 45 degree line where @i z ~Ti. Points between
the 45 degree line and the boundary are in 23, and points between the boundary and the
~i-axis are in ~. (If this were not so, then a point such as (~i, ~~i) = (1, O) would not be
in Ai.) It is easy to check that this configuration holds if p = O, or if p = 1 and q >0 (a
direct consequence of the fact that hP(z) l [0,1) iff O < z <1, in this case); and does not
hold if p = 1 and q <0 (in this cme hi(z) E [0,1) iff z > 1). By symmetry, the set d-i is
a mirror image of di.
Thus, if p = O, or p = 1 and q >0, the set B lies between the two boundaries (41) for
i = k, 1, and is flanked by the sets dk and Al on each side. If p = 1 and q ~ O, no smooth
boundaries exist (other than at the origin). The set B corresponds to the 45 degree line,
and the sets Ai to the space between that line and the ~i-axis.
Proof of proposition 13: Statement (i): Since the two factors are symmetric, a nec-
essary condition for efficiency is a symmetric technology Z~/Zl = 1. Looking at (39) and
(37), it is clear that ~/c/~1 = 1 only if ~1 = ~~. But ~1 = ~k is also a sufficient condition
for efficiency, because, given the efficient technology, proposition 2 shows that equilibrium
quantities are
Statement
efficient. Thus the efficient set & corresponds to the line ~1 = ~k.
(ii) follows immediately from the above characterization of the different
41regions. ￿l
Proof of proposition 1’: Existence of an incomplete-contracts equilibrium with tech-
nology choice was shown above by construction. Uniqueness follows from (i) the unique
determination of regions Ak, Al, and B (a point in region dk cannot also be in region Al
because the two sets lie on opposite sides of the 45 degree line; and cannot be in B because
the latter contains the 45 degree line, and smooth boundaries (41) are unique if they exist);
and (ii) the unique determination of equilibrium variables in each of those regions (based
on (37) for region ~ and on (39) for region 23).
We turn to the interior-equilibrium properties C, E~, U~ > 0, i = k, 1. Because we
have assumed that there are no pre-existing units (assumption 3), C > 0 follows from
Ei >0 by (2)-(3); and E~ >0 follows from a >0 in equations (37) (recalling that ~i < 1)
and (39). Ui = 1 – Ei > 0 follows from a < 1 in equations (37) and (39) (noting that
(1+ @-i)/(1 + @~~l/’) cannot be greater than 2).
The above existence, uniqueness, and interior-equilibrium properties also apply to an
efficient equilibrium with technology choice, since it simply corresponds to the special pa-
rameter configuration ~~ = ok. q
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